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BOOK REVIEW
TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM
AND ITS DISCONTENTS
CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND MONOPOLY
POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE. By Susan Crawford. New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press. 2013. Pp. 360. $30.00.

Reviewed by Christopher S. Yoo∗
INTRODUCTION
During the period after the Internet first emerged as a mass-market
phenomenon, it was almost always discussed in laudatory terms. The
shift in focus from manufacturing to technology-oriented industries
was creating a “new economy” characterized by higher growth rates
than previously thought possible.1 The Internet provided additional
opportunities to create value by enabling companies to reach consumers whose numbers were previously thought to be too small to be
served.2 At the same time, many praised the Internet for providing
better access to information and empowering individuals.3 The Supreme Court joined the chorus in Reno v. ACLU,4 lauding the Internet
as “a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human communication”5 that took “content . . . as diverse as human thought”6 and
made it “available to anyone, anywhere in the world.”7 Adopting a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ John H. Chestnut Professor of Law, Communication, and Computer & Information Science,
University of Pennsylvania Law School. The title is obviously modeled on SIGMUND FREUD,
CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (James Strachey ed. & trans., W.W. Norton 1961) (1930).
1 For the seminal use of the phrase, see Charles P. Alexander et al., The New Economy,
TIME, May 30, 1983, at 70. References to the new economy became so entrenched that the Council of Economic Advisers devoted its entire 2001 Annual Report to exploring the underpinnings
and implications of this shift. Council of Econ. Advisers, The Annual Report of the Council of
Economic Advisers, in ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 7 (2001), available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ERP-2001/pdf/ERP-2001.pdf.
2 See, e.g., Erik Brynjolfsson et al., Consumer Surplus in the Digital Economy: Estimating the
Value of Increased Product Variety at Online Booksellers, 49 MGMT. SCI. 1580, 1581 (2003).
3 See, e.g., NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 153–54 (1995).
4 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
5 Id. at 850 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6 Id. at 852 (quoting ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 842) (internal quotation mark omitted).
7 Id. at 851.
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mode of reasoning appropriately called technological determinism,8
many early commentators argued that technology is a force of nature
that can be neither stopped9 nor controlled.10
More recent commentary has continued to exhibit technological determinism, albeit with a more pessimistic attitude. These critics can be
organized into two camps.11 One warns that technology possesses a
potential dark side, agonizing over the danger that the Internet may be
shortening our attention span,12 crowding out cultural masterworks,13
weakening democracy,14 and undermining our humanity.15 Another
group retains the belief that technology can improve the human condition, while worrying that corporate interests may prevent the Internet
from realizing its potential unless the government intervenes.16
Professor Susan Crawford’s book, Captive Audience, adopts the second approach, viewed through the lens of the recent merger between
Comcast and NBC Universal. As an initial matter, Crawford is sharply critical of U.S. broadband Internet access, which she considers too
expensive and unavailable in many parts of the country (pp. 3, 185–
86). In addition, Crawford worries that the market for broadband access is becoming increasingly monopolistic, because cable-modem service is in the best position to provide the 100 megabytes per second
(Mbps) or 1 gigabyte per second (Gbps) service needed for highdefinition video (pp. 2, 64, 113, 172, 263–64). Although cable-modem
service once faced competition from telephone companies offering digital subscriber line (DSL) service (p. 53), she argues that DSL has become obsolete (pp. 64, 161, 225, 251, 259). Fiber-to-the-home (FTTH)
services such as Verizon FiOS can compete effectively with cable, but
the two companies that could have an effect in this field, AT&T and
Verizon, have not made this competition a reality: AT&T never pursued FTTH, and Verizon has stopped expanding its FiOS network
(pp. 3, 8, 78, 80, 113, 236). Instead, AT&T and Verizon have focused
on wireless broadband (pp. 10, 161, 237), which lacks the bandwidth
to compete effectively with cable (pp. 9, 64, 79, 121, 160–61, 234–35,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
8 Adam Thierer, The Case for Internet Optimism, Part 1: Saving the Net from Its Detractors,
in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE 57, 63 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2010).
9 See, e.g., NEGROPONTE, supra note 3, at 229–31.
10 See, e.g., John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
11 See Thierer, supra note 8, at 57–58.
12 See, e.g., NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS 5–10 (2010).
13 See, e.g., ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR 27–34 (2007).
14 See, e.g., LEE SIEGEL, AGAINST THE MACHINE 125–37, 165 (2008).
15 See, e.g., JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A GADGET 3–5 (Vintage Books 2011) (2010).
16 See, e.g., BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE 317–57 (2012); LAWRENCE LESSIG,
THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 262–65 (2001); BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE
AND INNOVATION 10 (2010); TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH 299–319 (2010); JONATHAN
ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET — AND HOW TO STOP IT 3–5 (2008).
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251). Wireless service is thus more properly regarded as a complement
rather than a competitor to cable service (pp. 9, 53, 64, 117, 156–157,
160, 251). Crawford concedes that these problems predated the merger
and would exist regardless of whether the merger was blocked or permitted to proceed (p. 230).
A concern more closely rooted to the merger is that placing Comcast’s network services and NBC Universal’s cable networks under
the same corporate umbrella will allow the combined entity to stifle
emerging online video distributors (OVDs), such as Netflix. The combination of Comcast’s supposed monopoly over high-speed Internet (p.
2) with key programming properties controlled by NBC Universal (pp.
132–33) will purportedly allow the merged company to restrict OVDs’
access both to last-mile connectivity17 (pp. 121, 175–85) and to musthave content (pp. 114–20, 174). To Crawford, this outcome seems inevitable. Crawford devotes a chapter to the proposed AT&T and TMobile merger, complaining that even though the government blocked
the merger, Verizon and AT&T would remain an effective duopoly and
would be unlikely to lower prices or improve services any time soon
(pp. 235, 251–52). She concludes that the best way to promote faster,
cheaper, symmetrical, reliable Internet access would be for the government to subsidize municipal FTTH and turn the Internet into a
public utility by bringing back common carriage (pp. 254–58, 264–66).
A brief look at the history of this sector underscores that any such
technologically deterministic predictions should be approached with extreme caution. There is good reason to question whether DSL and
wireless broadband can no longer compete with cable-modem service.
Moreover, previous firms that have attempted to restrict access to applications and content have met with dismal results. Early dial-up access providers, such as CompuServe and Prodigy, pursued this strategy,
only to see it fail.18 Complaints similar to those raised by Crawford
were lodged against Excite@Home,19 a cable company–owned Internet
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
17 Last-mile networks are those which control the last mile of cable before reaching consumers’ homes. Thus, even if OVDs transmitted their content over different networks, because Comcast controls access to the end consumers, any traffic to Comcast’s end users would pass through
its network (pp. 168, 182–85).
18 See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94
GEO. L.J. 1847, 1849 (2006).
19 See, e.g., Written Ex Parte of Professor Mark A. Lemley and Professor Lawrence Lessig,
Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations
from MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, 15 FCC Rcd. 9816 (2000)
(No. 99-251), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=6009850927; Mark A. Lemley
& Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the
Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 928–29, 932–33 (2001); Lawrence B. Solum & Minn
Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815,
936–37 (2004).
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service provider (ISP) that spectacularly fell into bankruptcy in 2001.20
Commentators also objected to the integration of video programming
and distribution when News Corp. acquired DirecTV in 2003,21 only
to see News Corp. reverse the transaction five short years later.22
More recently, Time Warner abandoned precisely the strategy that
Comcast–NBC Universal is supposedly pursuing when it separated its
programming properties from its cable network by spinning off Time
Warner Cable.23 And perhaps most notoriously, commentators protested the combination of content and conduit during America
Online’s 2001 acquisition of Time Warner,24 only to see the combination dissolve in 2009 at a loss of approximately $200 billion.25
Past failed attempts to combine content and conduit serve as a cautionary note regarding anyone’s ability to forecast which business
strategies will prove successful and instead counsel in favor of hesitating before basing prescriptive regulatory policies on any such predictions. As the long litany of failed Internet businesses demonstrates,
ownership of value-creating technologies is not sufficient to guarantee
commercial success, putting the lie to the oft-quoted mantra, “If you
build it, they will come.”26 Timing matters, as does the development
of complementary technologies and the manner in which technologies
are implemented. Instead, history counsels in favor of remaining
open-minded about new practices and preserving innovators’ ability to
experiment with alternative ways of doing business. Moreover, policymakers must keep in mind that the law of unintended consequences
means that regulatory interventions can often be counterproductive in
surprising ways. The fact that such change is disruptive and inevitably creates winners and losers, however, should not deter policymakers
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
20 See Ben Heskett & Rachel Konrad, Excite@Home Files for Bankruptcy, CNET NEWS
(Oct. 1, 2001, 7:50 AM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1033-273689.html.
21 See General Motors Corp. and Hughes Electronics Corp., Transferors, and the News Corp.
Ltd., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 FCC Rcd. 473, 476–77 ¶ 4 (2004).
22 News Corp. and the DirecTV Group, Inc., Transferors, and Liberty Media Corp., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 FCC Rcd. 3265, 3266 (2008).
23 Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses, Time
Warner Inc., and Its Subsidiaries, Assignor/Transferor, to Time Warner Cable Inc., and Its Subsidiaries, Assignee/Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 24 FCC Rcd. 879 (2009).
24 See, e.g., Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Hal J. Singer, Open Access to Broadband Networks: A Case
Study of the AOL/Time Warner Merger, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 631 (2001).
25 Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 179, 258; Press Release, Time Warner, Time Warner Inc. Completes Spin-Off
of AOL Inc. (Dec. 10, 2009), available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item
=UGFyZW50SUQ9MjMzODh8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBlPTM=&t=1.
26 This line is a common misquotation of the line made famous by the movie FIELD OF
DREAMS (Universal Pictures 1989). The proper quotation is, “If you build it, he will come.” See
Keertana Sastry, 15 Famous Movie Quotes Everyone Gets Wrong, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 10, 2012,
10:52 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/common-movie-misquotes-2012-5?op=1.
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from rejecting technological determinism and keeping a watchful eye
as events unfold.
Part I of this Book Review examines Crawford’s claim that cablemodem service will soon emerge as the dominant platform for broadband Internet access. Part II critiques her arguments that vertical integration of Comcast’s distribution infrastructure with NBC Universal’s
programming properties will harm consumers. Part III explores the
potential unintended consequences of regulatory intervention. Part IV
assesses Crawford’s recommendations in favor of municipal fiber and
common carriage.
I. THE LOOMING CABLE MONOPOLY
One of the book’s most recurrent tropes is its warning about the
“looming cable monopoly” over high-speed Internet service (p. 17).27
Even though cable-modem service providers capture only one-third of
broadband subscribers in their service areas, Crawford predicts that
two dynamics will soon allow cable companies to control somewhere
between 70% and 90% of the market (pp. 53, 65, 172), which will be
dominated by two companies: Comcast and, to a lesser degree, Time
Warner Cable (p. 235). The first is the demise of traditional fixed-line
telephone companies as broadband competitors. The second is wireless broadband’s inability to provide sufficient bandwidth to support
video programming. The one technology that Crawford thinks can
compete with cable is FTTH, which I will discuss below.28
A. Cable vs. DSL
As Crawford acknowledges, asymmetric DSL (ADSL) and cablemodem service once competed vigorously (p. 53). Early ADSL typically offered download speeds of 1.5 Mbps (with a theoretical maximum
of 10 Mbps) at a cost of $600 to $800 per subscriber.29 This was comparable to cable-modem service under the initial DOCSIS 1.0 standard, which typically offered download speeds of 3 Mbps at a cost of
$800 to $1000 per subscriber.30
Each technology was subject to a number of technological constraints. Telephone companies could provide ADSL only to customers

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
27
28
29

For similar references, see pp. 1, 53, 60, 64, 79, 85, 113, 251.
See infra section IV.A, pp. 945–48.
Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report, 14 FCC Rcd. 2398,
2431 chart 2, app. A at 2455 (1999) [hereinafter First Broadband Progress Report].
30 Id. at 2431 chart 2, app. A at 2456–57.
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located within 18,000 feet of a central office or a fiber node.31 ADSL,
moreover, was not a fully Internet-based service; some ADSL providers utilized a legacy circuit-based technology known as asynchronous
transfer mode (ATM) to route data transmissions internally.32 Because
cable-modem service shares bandwidth locally, effective quality of service depended on the current usage of immediate neighbors, which
made the quality of cable-modem service quite variable.33
In 2006, a new standard known as DOCSIS 3.0 enabled cablemodem providers to offer download speeds of 160 Mbps or faster.34
The industry reports that DOCSIS 3.0 is now available in 85% of U.S.
households.35 The higher speeds made possible by DOCSIS 3.0 rendered DSL obsolete (p. 161). Newer versions of DSL, such as AT&T’s
U-verse network, deploy additional fiber nodes to shorten the distance
between the node and the end user to two to four thousand feet,36
which increases download speeds to up to 24 Mbps.37 Crawford discounts U-verse as a competitor because AT&T had stopped its U-verse
buildout at 40–45% percent of its footprint and because fiber to the
node does not provide sufficient bandwidth to compete with DOCSIS
3.0 (p. 236). Indeed, the bandwidth limitations are so severe that
Crawford suggests telephone companies are in the process of abandoning DSL altogether (pp. 161, 259).
Recent history suggests that predictions of DSL’s demise may have
been premature. On November 7, 2012, AT&T announced Project Velocity IP, which included $6 billion to upgrade its DSL network.38
Specifically, AT&T plans to expand its U-verse network to approximately 8.5 million additional customer locations by the end of 2015,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
31 Id. at app. A at 2456; Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the
New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 255 (2002).
32 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,860 n.15 (2005).
33 See First Broadband Progress Report, supra note 29, at 2457.
34 See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Fifth Report, 23 FCC Rcd.
9615, 9619 ¶ 9 (2008). The 150 Mbps download speed is based on the assumption that firms deploying DOCSIS 3.0 only bond the minimum number of four channels. See id. at 9619 n.21.
Bonding more channels together should allow DOCSIS 3.0 to deliver speeds in the multiple–
gigabyte per second range. See Dale N. Hatfield, The Challenge of Increasing Broadband Capacity, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 43, 53–54 (2010).
35 Industry Data: Cable HSI DOCSIS 3 Service Availability, NAT’L CABLE & TELECOMM.
ASS’N, http://www.ncta.com/industry-data (last visited Nov. 1, 2013).
36 See Yoo, supra note 25, at 201.
37 AT&T U-verse High Speed Internet, AT&T, http://www.att.com/u-verse/explore/internet
-landing.jsp (last visited Nov. 1, 2013).
38 See Press Release, AT&T, AT&T to Invest $14 Billion to Significantly Expand Wireless and
Wireline Broadband Networks, Support Future IP Data Growth and New Services (Nov. 7, 2012),
available at http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=23506&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=35661.
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increasing its coverage to 33 million consumer and small business locations.39 This will extend U-verse from 32% to 43% of the households
in AT&T’s service area.40 AT&T will deploy technologies known as
pair bonding and vectoring to increase speeds still further.41 AT&T
predicts that 90% of U-verse households will receive download speeds
of 75 Mbps, and 75% will receive downloads speeds of 100 Mbps.42
Furthermore, for an additional 24 million households (or an additional 32% of AT&T’s footprint), AT&T plans to upgrade its current
ADSL network by replacing conventional DSL Access Multiplexers
(DSLAMs), which route data traffic internally using ATM, with new
IP DSLAMs, which route traffic internally using the Internet Protocol.43 Nearly 80% of IP DSLAM customers will receive download
speeds of 45 Mbps, and half of those customers will receive download
speeds of 75 Mbps.44 Together, these two expansions will cover 75%
of the customer locations in AT&T’s service area.45 Thus, contrary to
Crawford’s prediction, AT&T is expanding its U-verse offerings and
increasing its speeds.
This is not the first time commentators have prematurely attempted
to write off DSL. In November 1999, Professors Mark Lemley and
Lawrence Lessig noted that cable held an 80% to 20% lead over DSL
and predicted that ADSL was unlikely to narrow the gap quickly.46
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) saw the situation
differently in August 2000, predicting that ADSL would emerge as a
competitor to cable-modem service.47 The D.C. Circuit also noted that
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
39
40

Id.
Alan Weissberger, AT&T to Expand U-verse & IP-DSLAM; Bring Fiber to Commercial
Buildings & Cover 99% of US with LTE!, VIODI VIEW (Nov. 8, 2012), http://viodi.com/2012/11
/08/at-bring-fiber-to-commercial-buildings-cover-99-of-us-with-lte.
41 Kamalini Ganguly, AT&T Expands U-verse, Moves Closer to Integrated All-IP Network,
Services, OVUM (Nov. 13, 2012), http://ovum.com/2012/11/13/att-expands-u-verse-moves-closer-to
-integrated-all-ip-network-services.
42 Karl Bode, Details on Rumored New AT&T U-verse Speeds, DSL REPORTS (Mar. 21, 2013,
12:22 PM), http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/Details-on-Rumored-New-ATT-UVerse-Speeds
-123593 (citing statement from AT&T CEO John Donovan).
43 See Press Release, AT&T, supra note 38 (stating that AT&T plans to provide 24 million customer locations with high-speed IP Internet access).
44 Bode, supra note 42. AT&T announced the deployment of 45 Mbps service in forty markets
across fifteen states. Press Release, AT&T, 45 Mbps U-verse Internet Service Arrives in 40 Additional Markets (Aug. 26, 2013), available at http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=24734&cdvn
=news&newsarticleid=36934.
45 See Press Release, AT&T, supra note 38.
46 See Written Ex Parte of Professor Mark A. Lemley and Professor Lawrence Lessig, supra
note 19, at 30 ¶ 81; see also Lemley & Lessig, supra note 19, at 952 (stating that, as of 2000, cable’s market share in the residential broadband market was 70%).
47 See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Second Report, 15 FCC
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ADSL had emerged as a robust competitor to cable-modem service.48
History would vindicate the FCC and the D.C. Circuit. ADSL had
narrowed the ratio of cable-modem service to ADSL lines from 65% to
35% by the end of 200049 and would narrow the gap still further to 55%
to 45% by 2007.50 Since that time, ADSL has declined relative to cablemodem service, but has maintained a roughly 60% to 40% split.51
Crawford nonetheless asserts that subscribers require between 50
Mbps and 100 Mbps for video (pp. 2, 60).52 DSL cannot compete with
cable-modem service because it relies on last-mile communications
over copper wires that cannot deliver the necessary speeds (p. 236).
Indeed, Crawford predicts that end users will soon need gigabit service
(pp. 2, 263–64).
The data collected by the federal government fails to bear this out.
As of September 2012, the average subscribed speed was only 15.6
Mbps,53 despite the widespread availability of faster speeds.54 More–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Rcd. 20,913, 20,985 ¶ 189, 20,986 ¶ 191, 20,988 ¶ 196 (2000) (predicting that DSL would capture
13 million subscribers by 2004 versus 15.2 million subscribers to cable-modem service).
48 See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 428–29 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report, 17 FCC Rcd. 2844, 2864 ¶ 44, 2865
¶ 48 (2002); First Broadband Progress Report, supra note 29, at 2423 ¶ 48).
49 See INDUS. ANALYSIS DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR
INTERNET ACCESS: SUBSCRIBERSHIP AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2000, at 6 tbl.1 (2001), available
at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/hspd0801.pdf.
50 See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2007, at 6 tbl.1 (2009), available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-287962A1.pdf.
51 See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET ACCESS
SERVICES: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2012, at 23 tbl.5 (2013) [hereinafter JUNE 2012 INTERNET
ACCESS SERVICES REPORT], available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch
/DOC-321076A1.pdf.
52 Crawford also argues that broadband service should be symmetrical (pp. 2, 12, 262–64).
Symmetrical allocation of bandwidth would make sense if end users upload as frequently as they
download, typically associated with peer-to-peer traffic. This claim is undercut by the fact that
peer-to-peer traffic has plummeted from a high of over 65% of consumer Internet traffic in 2005
to below 20% in 2013 and is projected to fall still further in years to come. CHRISTOPHER S.
YOO, THE DYNAMIC INTERNET 30–31 (2012) [hereinafter YOO, THE DYNAMIC INTERNET].
Although Crawford attempts to justify her call for symmetrical bandwidth based on the needs of
businesses (pp. 12, 264), connecting businesses typically requires only laying fiber to a handful of
locations, which can be accomplished without incurring the substantial expense of laying fiber
networks in residential neighborhoods. Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet’s Architecture that Challenge the Status Quo, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79, 96 (2010) [hereinafter Yoo, Innovations in the Internet’s Architecture].
53 OFFICE OF ENG’G & TECH. & CONSUMER & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS BUREAU, FED.
COMMC’NS COMM’N, 2013 MEASURING BROADBAND AMERICA: A REPORT ON CONSUMER
WIRELINE BROADBAND PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S. 6 (2013), available at http://transition.fcc
.gov/cgb/measuringbroadbandreport/2013/Measuring-Broadband-America-feb-2013.pdf.
54 NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN. & FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, BROADBAND STATISTICS REPORT: ACCESS TO BROADBAND TECHNOLOGY BY SPEED 4 (2013), available at
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over, as of June 2012, where download speeds of 100 Mbps or more
were available, only 0.12% of households subscribed to service of that
speed.55 Where download speeds of 25 Mbps or more were available,
only 10.75% of households subscribed.56 Adoption rates for 100 Mbps
service in countries that Crawford views as models for broadband policy are similarly disappointing.57 Thus, the vast majority of customers
with the opportunity to purchase faster service decline to do so. Indeed, Crawford concedes as much when she observes that consumers
are only now beginning to purchase higher tiers (p. 182).
In short, telephone companies have been able to wring more bandwidth out of the twisted pair of copper telephone lines than anyone
could have imagined. Whether the 45 Mbps to 100 Mbps service that
AT&T is able to provide via DSL is sufficient to compete with cable
remains to be seen.
B. Cable vs. Wireless Broadband
As noted above, Crawford’s argument that cable companies will
monopolize Internet access also depends on her assertion that wireless
broadband lacks the bandwidth to serve as a substitute for cable (pp.
9, 64, 79, 121, 160–61, 234–35, 251). Wireless service is instead more
properly regarded as a complement rather than a competitor to cable
service (pp. 9, 53, 64, 117, 156, 157, 160, 251). This claim is quite
striking, because wireless broadband represents one of the most successful recent developments in the broadband market. Measured
at the lowest-speed tier, as of June 2012 mobile wireless broadband
had captured 153 million subscribers, more than triple the number of
cable-modem subscribers.58 Moreover, mobile wireless broadband
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
http://www2.ntia.doc.gov/files/broadband-data/Technology%20by%20Speed%20JUN%202012.pdf
(reporting that 78% of households had access to 25 Mbps service as of June 2012).
55 Specifically, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA)
study indicates that 100 Mbps service was available in 46.37% of 136,714,122 household units,
which equals 63.4 million households. Id. Only 74,000 households subscribed to 100 Mbps,
which equals 0.12% of households with access to it. JUNE 2012 INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES
REPORT, supra note 51, at 31 tbl.11. Even if one considers all subscribers to 100 Mbps service
and not just residential subscribers, 156,000 subscriptions still equals a minuscule take-up rate of
0.25%. Id. at 30 tbl.10.
56 The NTIA study indicates that 25 Mbps service was available in 77.57% of 136,714,122
household units, which equals 106.0 million households. NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN.
& FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 54, at 4. Only 11,324,000 households subscribed to 25
Mbps service, which equals 10.68% of households with access to it. JUNE 2012 INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES REPORT, supra note 51, at 31 tbl.11.
57 In Europe, take-up rate for 100 Mbps service is one line per 100 inhabitants, which translates to roughly 2% of households. Commission Staff Working Document: Digital Agenda Scoreboard 2013, at 56, SWD (2013) 217 final (June 12, 2013), available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital
-agen d a/ si tes /di g it al - a ge nd a/f il es/ DA E % 20S C OR EB OA R D % 202013% 20-% 20SW D % 202013
%20217%20FINAL.pdf.
58 See JUNE 2012 INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES REPORT, supra note 51, at 1, 23 tbl.5.
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subscribers increased by 28% over the preceding twelve-month period,
as compared with the more modest 6% growth rate for cable modem.59
Most of the subscribers in the June 2012 data reportedly subscribed
to third-generation (3G) wireless technologies, which provide somewhat limited bandwidth. The ongoing deployment of the fourthgeneration (4G) wireless technology known as Long Term Evolution
(LTE) promises to make mobile broadband an even more effective
competitor to cable-modem service. Although Verizon’s LTE service
advertises peak download speeds of 25 Mbps and average speeds of 12
Mbps, Crawford expresses doubts as to whether Verizon can actually
deliver on those promises (p. 251). She need not have worried. Independent news reports indicate that AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile are
delivering peak download speeds of between 49 and 66 Mbps and average download speeds of between 12 and 19 Mbps.60 Sprint advertises and delivers slower rates for its LTE service.61
Moreover, mobile broadband providers’ expansion plans are extremely aggressive. Verizon began its LTE deployment in December
2010 and covered its entire 3G footprint with LTE by mid-2013,62
serving 300 million people or 96% of the U.S. population.63 AT&T,
which launched LTE in September 2011,64 plans to reach 80% of the
U.S. population by the end of 2013 and to complete the build-out of its
entire network by the end of 2014, at which point it should reach 96%
of the U.S. population.65 Sprint launched LTE in July 2012 and forecasts reaching 200 million people by the end of 2013.66 T-Mobile be–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
59
60

See id. at 1, 23 tbl.5.
See Patrick Linder, Lightning-Fast Data Speeds and Expanding Coverage: A 4G LTE Performance Review, ROOT METRICS (Mar. 11, 2003), http://www.rootmetrics.com/special-reports
/lte-performance-review [hereinafter Root Metrics Study] (reporting peak and average download
speeds of 57.7 Mbps and 18.6 Mbps for AT&T LTE and 49.3 Mbps and 14.3 Mbps for Verizon
LTE); Sascha Segan, Fastest Mobile Networks 2013, PC MAG. (June 17, 2013), http://www.pcmag
.com/article2/0,2817,2420334,00.asp (reporting peak and average download speeds of 66.11 Mbps
and 16.65 Mbps for AT&T LTE, 62.03 Mbps and 12.07 Mbps for T-Mobile LTE, and 59.83 Mbps
and 11.93 Mbps for Verizon LTE).
61 See Root Metrics Study, supra note 60 (reporting peak and average download speeds of 32.7
Mbps and 10.3 Mbps for Sprint LTE); Segan, supra note 60 (reporting peak and average download speeds of 32.32 Mbps and 5.55 Mbps for Sprint LTE).
62 Andy Patrizio, Verizon’s LTE Coverage Will Match 3G Coverage by Mid-2013, BRIGHTHAND (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.brighthand.com/default.asp?newsID=19521.
63 Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Sixteenth Report, 28 FCC Rcd. 3700, 3727 n.51, 3745 tbl.3 (2013) [hereinafter Sixteenth Annual Mobile Wireless Competition Report].
64 Id. at 3775 ¶ 96.
65 Id. at 3707.
66 Phil Goldstein, Sprint Loses 337,000 Net Subs, Lowers LTE Coverage Goal to 200M by YearEnd, FIERCE WIRELESS (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/sprint-loses-337000
-net-subs-lowers-lte-coverage-goal-200m-year-end/2013-02-07.
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gan deploying LTE in March 201367 and forecasts reaching 200 million
people by the end of the year.68 Smaller providers, such as Leap, U.S.
Cellular, and C-Spire, are also deploying LTE.69
Crawford nonetheless maintains that wireless broadband cannot
compete with cable modem because subscribers will need between 50
Mbps and 100 Mbps for video (pp. 2, 60, 174). It is far from clear that
video requires that much bandwidth. Skype recommends 1.5 Mbps
for HD video calling and 2–8 Mbps for group video, depending on the
number of people involved.70 Netflix recommends 7 Mbps for Super
HD and 12 Mbps for 3D.71 Given video’s relatively modest demand
for bandwidth, it comes as no surprise that the vast majority of Americans do not purchase such speeds when they are available.72
It is thus plausible that wireless broadband can deliver the broadband speeds that consumers actually demand. Calls for ever-faster
service risk running afoul of what Professor Clayton Christensen
called the “innovator’s dilemma,” which provides an explanation for
why market-leading firms that pioneer new technologies are often displaced by later arriving firms that are less sophisticated.73 The innovating firms become preoccupied with pursuing the cutting edge of
technology and produce products that exceed what consumers actually
need. This in turn creates an opening for new products that are technologically inferior but more in line with what consumers actually
want.74 In contrast to Schumpeterian gales of creative destruction,
Christensen’s disruptive innovation does not arise from better technology, but from better business models.75 Rather than becoming caught
up in a technophile’s affinity for the cutting edge, broadband providers
should focus on what consumers actually need.
As the National Broadband Plan notes, whether wireless broadband can serve as an effective competitor to cable thus depends on
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
67 Phil Goldstein, T-Mobile to Launch LTE in March, Updates Galaxy Note II for LTE, FIERCE
WIRELESS (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/t-mobile-launch-lte-march-updates
-galaxy-note-ii-lte/2013-03-18.
68 Sixteenth Annual Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 63, at 3707.
69 Id.
70 How Much Bandwidth Does Skype Need?, SKYPE, https://support.skype.com/en/faq/FA1417
/how-much-bandwidth-does-skype-need (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).
71 Internet Connection Speed Recommendations, NETFLIX, https://support.netflix.com/en
/node/306 (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).
72 See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
73 CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA, at xv (1997).
74 Id. at 165.
75 CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN ET AL., SEEING WHAT’S NEXT: USING THE THEORIES
OF INNOVATION TO PREDICT INDUSTRY CHANGE 16 (2004); see also Raphael Amit &
Christoph Zott, Creating Value Through Business Model Innovation, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV.,
Spring 2012, at 41; Mark W. Johnson et al., Reinventing Your Business Model, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Dec. 2008, at 50, 52.
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how quickly the demand for wireless bandwidth develops.76 Press reports indicate that some people are beginning to drop their fixed-line
broadband connection and rely entirely on their wireless device for
their broadband capability.77 A survey conducted by the British Office
of Communications (Ofcom) revealed that 6% of U.S. households relied entirely on mobile broadband for their Internet connectivity as of
October 2011.78 A 2011 Cisco study estimates that 15% of customers
may drop wireline broadband in favor of wireless.79 The Dish Network based its failed bid for Sprint in part on the belief that as
many as one third of Americans may prefer to rely exclusively on wireless broadband.80 Moreover, in May 2012, Verizon began offering a
HomeFusion service, which uses LTE to provide fixed wireless broadband to homes.81 A phone survey conducted in late 2012 indicated
that 8% of all U.S. adults and 10% of adult Internet users rely exclusively on their smartphones for their Internet connectivity.82
By the time that consumers begin to demand such higher speeds,
LTE could well be able to meet that demand. Some operators, such as
the United Kingdom’s leading wireless provider, EE (formerly known
as Everything Everywhere), have assembled sufficient contiguous
spectrum to offer LTE service with download speeds of 150 Mbps.83
The International Telecommunications Union has also issued standards for the next generation of wireless communications, known as
LTE Advanced, which is theoretically capable of providing download

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
76 FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND
PLAN 40–42 (2010) [hereinafter NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN], available at http://download
.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf.
77 Anton Troianovski, People Are Cutting the Cord — For Web More than TV, WALL ST. J.,
May 30, 2013, at B1.
78 OFCOM, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS MARKET REPORT 2011, at 171 fig.5.1,
304 fig.6.77 (2011).
79 Cisco Internet Bus. Solutions Grp., To Prevent 15% of Customers from Cord-Cutting, Fixed
Broadband SPs Consider WiFi Solutions to Deliver the Mobility Customers Seek, CISCO (Oct.
2011), http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac79/docs/FastFacts/FastFacts_WiFi_Defense_against_BB
_Cord_Cutting_Oct2011.pdf.
80 See Hal Singer, Wireless Competition Under the Senate’s Microscope, FORBES (June 4,
2013, 10:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halsinger/2013/06/04/wireless-competition-under-the
-senates-microscope.
81 HomeFusion Broadband From Verizon Now Available Nationwide on America’s Largest 4G
LTE Network, VERIZON WIRELESS (May 2, 2012), http://news.verizonwireless.com/news/2012/05
/pr2012-05-02.html.
82 See Chris McGovern et al., Smartphones as a Substitute: Why Some Smartphone Users
Aren’t Subscribing at Home 5 (Sept. 13, 2013) (paper presented at the 41st Annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2242689.
83 Kevin Fitchard, Why Is SK Telecom’s LTE Network “Advanced” While EE’s Is Not?,
GIGAOM (July 3, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://gigaom.com/2013/07/03/why-is-sk-telecoms-lte-network
-advanced-while-ees-is-not.

926

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 127:914

speeds of 3 Gbps and upload speeds of 1.5 Gbps.84 South Korea’s
leading wireless provider, SK Telecom, launched LTE Advanced in
June 2013 and has successfully delivered data speeds of up to 150
Mbps.85 Korean provider LG Uplus86 and Australian provider Telstra
have followed suit, with the latter planning to provide service up to
300 Mbps.87
It is at least plausible that wireless broadband might serve as a
long-term substitute for wireline broadband. Such a development
would undercut claims of a looming cable monopoly. Once wireless
broadband is included, the FCC’s June 2012 data indicate that 92% of
U.S. households resided in census blocks where three or more providers offered service at or near the benchmarks established by the National Broadband Plan.88 Moreover, 62% of U.S. households resided
in census blocks where three or more providers offered 6 Mbps/1.5
Mbps service, and 23% of households resided in census blocks where
three or more providers offered 10 Mbps/1.5 Mbps service.89
Moreover, as Figure 1 shows, these trends have been steadily improving. Given that LTE averages more than 10 Mbps, the competitiveness in the higher tiers is likely to improve. Indeed, once the major
providers finish deploying LTE across their entire footprints, we
can expect 97.2% of households to reside in census blocks in which
three or more providers have deployed wireless broadband service that
exceeds 10 Mbps, and 92.8% will have four such providers.90 The inclusion of wireless services also has the potential to substantially lessen
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
84 See Jeanette Wannstrom, LTE-Advanced, 3GPP (May 2012), http://www.3gpp.org/lte
-advanced.
85 Tammy Parker, SK Telecom: Take a Closer Look at Its LTE Advanced Rollout, FIERCE
BROADBAND WIRELESS (July 11, 2013), http://www.fiercewireless.com/tech/special-reports/sk
-telecom-take-closer-look-its-lte-advanced-rollout.
86 Lance Whitney, South Korea Launches Second LTE-Advanced Network, CNET (July 18,
2013, 6:40 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-57594325-94/south-korea-launches-second-lte
-advanced-network.
87 See Kevin Fitchard, Asia’s Turbo-Charged LTE Networks Show What’s in Store for the U.S.,
Europe, GIGAOM (Aug. 12, 2013, 12:44 PM), http://gigaom.com/2013/08/12/asias-turbo-charged
-lte-networks-show-whats-in-store-for-the-u-s-europe (reporting Telstra’s recent live network trial
of LTE Advanced).
88 See JUNE 2012 INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES REPORT, supra note 51, at 10 fig.5(b). In
2010, the FCC updated its benchmark for broadband service to 4 Mbps downstream and 1 Mbps
upstream. Inquiry Considering the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to
All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the
Broadband Improvement Act, Sixth Broadband Deployment Report, 25 FCC Rcd. 9556, 9563
¶ 11 (2010). The FCC used the closest speed tier available in the existing data, which was 3
Mbps downstream and 768 kbps upstream. Id. at 9569 ¶ 20.
89 JUNE 2012 INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES REPORT, supra note 51, at 10 fig.5(b).
90 See Sixteenth Annual Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 63, at 3747 tbl.5.
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FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS LOCATED
CENSUS BLOCKS WITH THREE OR MORE FIXED-LINE OR
WIRELESS BROADBAND PROVIDERS AS OF JUNE 30, 201291

IN

the digital divide, lowering the number of unserved Americans from
19 million (6%) as of June 2011 to 5.5 million (1.7%).92
Once this expansion in access to wireless broadband service occurs,
the competitive landscape could well look quite different. Empirical
studies have shown that “most of the increase in competition comes
with the entry of the second and third firms.”93 This insight is reflect–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
91 Sources: Id.; INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET
ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2011, at 10 fig.5(b) (2013), available at http://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-318810A1.pdf; INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH.
DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30,
2011, at 9 fig.3(b) (2012), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC
-314630A1.pdf; INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2010, at 9 fig.3(b) (2011), available at http://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-310261A1.pdf; INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH.
DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30,
2010, at 8 fig.3(b) (2011), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC
-305296A1.pdf; INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2009, at 8 fig.3(b) (2010), available at http://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-303405A1.pdf.
92 Inquiry Considering the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, Eighth Broadband Progress Report, 27 FCC Rcd. 10,342, 10,384
tbl.15 (2012).
93 Timothy F. Bresnahan & Peter C. Reiss, Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets,
99 J. POL. ECON. 977, 1007 (1991).
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ed in actual antitrust enforcement policy, which has increasingly permitted four-to-three mergers.94 In addition, policymakers must bear in
mind that regulation is neither perfect nor costless. As a result, the decision whether to intervene is inherently an exercise in the comparative
second-best. When the comparison is between unregulated and regulated monopoly, the former performs so badly that the balance tips in
favor of intervention. By contrast, although an unregulated three-firm
oligopoly does not perform as well as perfect competition, it may perform sufficiently well to tip the balance the other way.95 Moreover,
even if wireless broadband is not a substitute for all applications, to
the extent that it serves as an alternative platform for email and other,
lower-bandwidth applications, it may still exert a degree of price discipline on cable. And for those households that currently do not have
access to broadband at all, LTE may represent their best hope.
Past examples provide some encouragement that wireless broadband is or may soon become a substitute for cable. For example, although initially regarded as a complementary technology, wireless telephony is now a substitute for traditional wireline telephony. The
number of wireless telephone connections surpassed that of wireline
connections in late 2004,96 and as of the end of 2012, 38% of U.S.
households relied entirely on wireless technologies for voice communications, a number that is increasing steadily each year.97
Admittedly, many broadband technologies, such as satellite broadband, developed more slowly than many anticipated. Others, such as
broadband over powerline, MDS, and WiMax, never fulfilled the
promise that many envisioned. In technology-related industries, however, people tend to overestimate what they can accomplish in the
short run while underestimating their potential in the long run.98 As a
result, there is reason to maintain an open mind and focus on each
technology’s long-run potential for success.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
94 See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 61 & n.233
(2005) (collecting sources).
95 See Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New Model for
U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 84–99 (2007).
96 Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Essay, On the Regulation of Networks as Complex
Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1687, 1688 (2005).
97 See STEPHEN J. BLUMBERG & JULIAN V. LUKE, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, WIRELESS SUBSTITUTION: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JULY–DECEMBER 2012, at 1 (2013), available at http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/wireless201306.pdf.
98 See, e.g., J.C.R. LICKLIDER, LIBRARIES OF THE FUTURE 17 n.† (1965).
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II. THE VERTICAL INTEGRATION
OF CONTENT AND DISTRIBUTION
Crawford is also concerned that Comcast’s market power will be
enhanced still further by its merger with NBC Universal.99 Before the
merger, Comcast was almost exclusively a video distribution company
that owned only a few minor cable networks that comprised roughly
3% of the programming market revenues.100 NBC Universal was almost exclusively a programming company, whose only distribution assets were a handful of broadcast television stations101 that Crawford
acknowledges are a dying part of the industry (pp. 128–31).
Because the merger involved companies that, for the most part,
did not compete directly with one another, Crawford somewhat grudgingly recognizes that it is properly regarded as a vertical merger (pp.
106–08, 188).102 As such, section A locates the merger with respect
to the primary theories about how vertical integration can harm competition. Section B analyzes the extent to which the merger would
allow Comcast to attack the market for video programming and distribution. Section C looks at other actors that are positioned to affect
the level of competition.
A. Primer on Vertical Integration
Conventional economic theory identifies two ways that a vertical
merger can harm competition.103 First, a firm with a dominant position in one market (often called the primary market) can attempt to
use vertical integration to attack an adjacent market (often called the
secondary market).104 In the context of the Comcast–NBC Universal
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
99 One area where Crawford and I find common ground is our dismay over how regulatory
authorities often use the merger clearance process to extract concessions that have nothing to do
with the merger (pp. 209–10). For my own views, see Christopher S. Yoo, Merger Review by the
Federal Communications Commission: The Comcast–NBC Universal Merger, 43 REV. INDUS.
ORG. (forthcoming 2014).
100 Consumers, Competition, and Consolidation in the Video and Broadband Market: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech., & the Internet of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., &
Transp., 111th Cong. 89 (2010) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of Christopher S. Yoo, Professor of Law and Communication, and Founding Director, Center for Technology, Innovation,
and Competition, University of Pennsylvania).
101 Id.
102 At other moments, Crawford signals some ambivalence about characterizing the merger as
vertical. For example, in the book’s introduction, she offers a subtle gibe by describing Comcast’s
description of the merger as a vertical one as a “smooth response[]” that Comcast was willing to
share with anyone willing to engage them on the substance of the deal (p. 7). She later repeats
Senator Al Franken’s belief that the merger was not as vertical as Comcast would have the Senate Judiciary Committee believe (p. 87).
103 The discussion in this section draws heavily on Yoo, supra note 31, at 187–206.
104 Id. at 185.
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merger, this would amount to the claim that Comcast was using its
control over last-mile distribution to render the market for video programming or Internet content less competitive. Certain structural preconditions must exist for this theory to have any coherence. As an initial matter, Comcast must have a dominant position in distribution;
otherwise it has nothing to use as leverage.105 In addition, the secondary market must be concentrated and protected by entry barriers; otherwise any attempt to raise prices in the secondary market will simply
cause others to turn to unintegrated capacity in the secondary market
or will stimulate entry sufficient to dissipate any advantages that the
vertically integrated firm may temporarily enjoy.106 The competitiveness and the ease of entry into the markets for both video programming and Internet content meant that this theory did not play a significant role in the analysis of the merger conducted by the Justice
Department or by the FCC.
Second, a firm can attempt to use vertical integration into a secondary market to maintain and protect its dominant position in its
primary market.107 This theory suggests that Comcast’s goal was to
protect its position in the market for video distribution. Tying up key
programming properties will force firms who wish to compete with
Comcast in video distribution to produce their own sources of programming. Similar structural preconditions apply. Forcing a firm to
find alternative sources of programming is unproblematic, however,
when unintegrated sources of supply exist or if entry into video programming is easy.108
Third, it is widely recognized that vertical integration can create
substantial efficiencies.109 The existence of these efficiencies means
that vertical integration may benefit consumers even when the market
is structured in a way that makes anticompetitive effects plausible.110
This is why vertical mergers have long been recognized as being less
likely to create competitive problems than horizontal mergers.111
The net result is that the economic impact of vertical integration is
ambiguous as a theoretical matter and cannot be determined a priori.
Whether the law should adopt an accommodating or skeptical stance
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
105
106
107
108

Id. at 188.
Id.
Id. at 186, 191.
1984 Merger Guidelines §§ 4.211–.212, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,835–36 (June 29, 1984),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/2614.htm; see also 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,552 (Sept. 10, 1992) (reaffirming section 4 of the 1984 Merger Guidelines governing nonhorizontal mergers).
109 See, e.g., 1984 Merger Guidelines § 4.24, 49 Fed. Reg. at 26,837; Yoo, supra note 31, at 192–98.
110 See, e.g., Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON.
335, 354–55 (1988).
111 1984 Merger Guidelines § 4.0, 49 Fed. Reg. at 26,834.
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toward vertical mergers is thus an empirical question. A recent survey
of the empirical literature on vertical integration across a wide range
of industries concluded that “under most circumstances, profitmaximizing vertical-integration decisions are efficient, not just from
firms’ but also from the consumers’ points of view.”112 It also found
“clear evidence that restrictions on vertical integration that are imposed . . . on owners of retail networks are usually detrimental to consumers.”113 It thus called on “government agencies to reconsider the
validity of such restrictions.”114
The empirical studies on the cable industry in particular support
the same conclusion.115 Most find vertical integration to be welfare
enhancing116 or ambiguous.117 Only one study found consumer harm,
and in that case the size of the welfare loss was so miniscule ($0.60 per
subscriber per year)118 that it was not worth government intervention.
Moreover, the data collected by the FCC belie claims that vertical
integration is a growing problem. The FCC data from 1990 and 2006
demonstrate a clear and dramatic reduction in the level of vertical integration in the industry.
The data from 2012 are harder to interpret, because for internal political reasons the FCC did not issue a report covering 2007 to 2011,
and when it resumed reporting data, it did so using a different format.
As an initial matter, the FCC stopped reporting how many of the top
cable networks by subscribership and prime time viewership were vertically integrated with a cable or satellite provider, so other sources had
to be used to identify those networks.119 More importantly, whereas all
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
112 Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 629, 680 (2007).
113 Id.
114 Id.; accord Michael H. Riordan, Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration, in HANDBOOK
OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 145, 169 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008) (“A general presumption that
vertical integration is pro-competitive is warranted by a substantial economics literature identifying efficiency benefits of vertical integration, including empirical studies demonstrating positive
effects of vertical integration in various industries.”).
115 For a review, see Yoo, supra note 31, at 238–41.
116 See, e.g., BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 246–50 (1992)
(reviewing studies by Benjamin Klein, Robert Crandall, and the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration); Tasneem Chipty, Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and
Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television Industry, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 428 (2001); Michael G.
Vita, Must Carry Regulations for Cable Television Systems: An Empirical Analysis, 12 J. REG.
ECON. 159 (1997).
117 See, e.g., David Waterman & Andrew A. Weiss, The Effects of Vertical Integration Between
Cable Television Systems and Pay Cable Networks, 72 J. ECONOMETRICS 357, 391 (1996).
118 George S. Ford & John D. Jackson, Horizontal Concentration and Vertical Integration in the
Cable Television Industry, 12 REV. INDUS. ORG. 501, 515 (1997). See generally James C. Cooper et
al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 639, 648 (2005).
119 Compare Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of
Video Programming, Thirteenth Annual Report, 24 FCC Rcd. 542, 737–38 tbls.C-5 & C-6 (2009)
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FIGURE 2: VERTICAL INTEGRATION
IN THE CABLE INDUSTRY, 1990–2012120

previous reports distinguished among cable networks that were (1) affiliated with a cable operator, (2) affiliated with another media company, or (3) independent,121 the 2012 report apparently includes information only on the first two categories.122 As a result, the 2012 report
leaves out independent networks, including such important programming sources as BBC America, Bloomberg Television, the NFL Network, the Outdoor Channel, and the Tennis Channel. By way of comparison, 357 (63%) of the 549 networks listed in the report in 2009
were neither affiliated with a cable operator nor another media company,123 which suggests that the 2012 report both undercounts the total
number of networks and overstates the degree of vertical integration.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
[hereinafter 2009 Video Competition Report], with 2012 Video Competition Report, supra note 120
(omitting these tables).
120 Sources: Senate Hearing, supra note 100, at 93 fig.9; Annual Assessment of the Status of
Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Fourteenth Report, 27 FCC
Rcd. 8610, app. B at 8796–801 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 Video Competition Report] (reporting
number of vertically integrated programming services); SNL KAGAN, ECONOMICS OF BASIC
CABLE NETWORKS 46 (2012); TV Network Summary, SNL INTERACTIVE, http://www.snl.com
/interactivex/tv_NetworksSummary.aspx (three chosen variables: (1) Network Type: Basic Cable;
(2) Financial Item: Subscribers (M); (3) Year: 2009–2016) (last visited June 21, 2013).
121 See, e.g., 2009 Video Competition Report, supra note 119, at 690–710 tbls.C-1 & C-2 (2009).
122 See 2012 Video Competition Report, supra note 120, app. B at 8796–801 tbl.B-1.
123 See 2009 Video Competition Report, supra note 119, at 695–710 tbl.C-2.
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A review of other sources suggests that the undercounting is significant.124 If the number of unaffiliated networks is estimated to be in
the same proportion as in 2006, the degree of vertical integration drops
to 16%, more or less in line with the previous data.
The tendency of vertical integration to benefit consumers makes it
appropriate to place the burden on those opposing the merger to
demonstrate consumer harm.125 At a minimum, the models require a
number of structural preconditions that must be satisfied before it
seems likely that consumers may be harmed.126
The empirical data on vertical integration raise doubts as to
whether the Comcast–NBC Universal merger is likely to harm consumers. Such claims become even less tenable after one examines the
specific mechanisms that the book suggests the merged company
would use to harm OVDs and the steps that Netflix is taking to assert
its own bargaining power.
B. An Evaluation of the Merger
Crawford argues that the merger of Comcast and NBC Universal
will enable the company to favor its own video platform by withholding content from Netflix and other OVDs or by charging OVDs more
to deliver their content. Although Comcast was increasingly shifting
focus away from video distribution and toward high-speed Internet
access (pp. 66, 112, 172–73),127 Crawford argues that Comcast still
sought to slow down the growth of OVDs until it could transition its
customers to its own Internet-based video distribution platform (pp.
103–04, 113, 117–19, 165, 173, 228).
This argument is complicated somewhat by the fact that Comcast–
NBC Universal holds ownership stakes in two different OVDs. The
first is Xfinity Streampix, which is Comcast’s version of the TV Everywhere verification system created by the cable companies to authenticate that Internet Protocol television viewers are paying cable
subscribers. The second is Hulu, the joint venture that NBC Universal helped launch.
At this writing, neither Xfinity nor Hulu seems like much of a
threat to Netflix. Notwithstanding the existence of statements praising
the product (p. 166), Comcast chairman and CEO Brian Roberts ad–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
124 A review of SNL Kagan reveals that the FCC report does not list 68 (34%) of the 198 networks that SNL Kagan tracks. TV Network Summary, supra note 120.
125 2009 Video Competition Report, supra note 119, at 661–62.
126 Yoo, supra note 31, at 200–04.
127 Indeed, the CEO of Cablevision caused a stir when he candidly acknowledged that the cable industry of the future may cease distributing television programming and instead may simply
become a broadband provider. Shalini Ramachandran & Martin Peers, Future of Cable Might
Not Include TV, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2013, at B1.
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mits that Xfinity has made a number of missteps.128 Hulu is also
struggling. After initially relying exclusively on advertising since its
launch in 2007, it added a subscription service called Hulu Plus in
2010, which is currently priced at $7.99 per month. During 2012, Hulu
garnered $695 million in revenue (an increase of 65%), reached 3 million subscribers (an annual 100% increase), and spent $500 million to
acquire content.129 The venture remained unprofitable, however. Although the company does not report earnings, a recent disclosure in
Disney’s financial statements indicated that it is losing as much as $30
million per quarter.130 The saving grace is that Hulu has become an
acquisition target, with the bidders including AT&T, Yahoo!, DirecTV,
and Time Warner Cable, among others.131
While impressive, these numbers pale in comparison to those of
Netflix, which captured $3.6 billion in revenue132 and roughly 30 million subscribers as of September 2013,133 and committed to spending
$2 billion on content in the year beginning in September 2012 with an
additional $3.5 billion in future commitments.134 Netflix’s growth continued in the first quarter of 2013, reaching $1 billion in quarterly revenue for the first time.135 Its market capitalization is roughly $12 billion, fifteen to twenty times larger than the reported purchase price of
Hulu. It is easy to see why Crawford was pessimistic about Netflix’s
fate in 2012 after the Comcast–NBC Universal merger. Netflix’s market capitalization reached a high of $15.7 billion in July 2011 only to
drop into the $3 billion range in November 2011, before recovering in
January 2013 and reaching nearly $20 billion in November 2013.136
The development of its Open Connect CDN and its sponsorship of
original programming are potential game changers. As Crawford rec–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
128 Alex Ben Block, Comcast’s Brian Roberts Talks TV Everywhere, New Entertainment System
and the Cloud, HOLLYWOOD REP. (June 11, 2013, 10:32 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com
/news/comcasts-brian-roberts-talks-tv-566200.
129 Matthew Panzarino, Hulu’s 2012: Revenue Up 65% to $695M, Subscribers Double to 3M,
28% More Advertisers, THE NEXT WEB (Dec. 17, 2012, 6:36 PM), http://thenextweb.com/apple
/2012/12/17/hulus-2012-revenue-up-65-to-695m-subscribers-double-to-3m-28-more-advertisers.
130 Christopher S. Stewart & John Jannarone, Hulu’s Fork in the Road, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21,
2012, at B1.
131 Amol Sharma & Martin Peers, Corporate Watch: Hulu, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2013, at B4.
132 See Netflix Revenue (Quarterly), YCHARTS, http://ycharts.com/companies/NFLX/revenues
(last visited Nov. 24, 2013).
133 Dawn C. Chmielewski, Analyst Projects 40 Million Netflix Streaming Subscribers by Late
2015, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2013, 9:44 AM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope
/cotown/la-et-ct-netflix-to-exceed-40-million-subscribers-by-2015-20130916,0,5429456.story.
134 Julianne Pepitone, Netflix Will Lose Money for All of 2012, CNN MONEY (Nov. 22, 2011,
4:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/22/technology/netflix_unprofitable/index.htm.
135 Netflix Revenue (Quarterly), supra note 132.
136 See Netflix Market Cap, YCHARTS, http://ycharts.com/companies/NFLX/market_cap (last
visited Nov. 24, 2013).
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ognizes, Netflix deserves its reputation for being innovative and nimble (p. 115).
Moreover, it is hard to see how Comcast–NBC Universal could use
its control over content to harm competition. To do so would require
the merged company to have a dominant position in content and the
market to be protected by entry barriers.137 Although cable networks
such as USA Network and SyFy offer excellent programming, there is
no reason they cannot be replicated. For most types of programming,
NBC Universal is simply one of several movie studios creating longform video content, and beyond the existing studios, creative talent
and the physical equipment necessary to create original programming
exist in sufficient amounts to ensure that content will always be available.138 Indeed, Netflix is developing its own original programming,
led by the political drama House of Cards and later followed by new
episodes of Arrested Development.139 Hulu and Amazon are following
Netflix’s lead and creating original programming of their own.140
Investors’ optimism about Netflix is captured by its price-toearnings (P/E) ratio, which reflects the expected growth rates for each
company. Even before 2013, during Netflix’s recent doldrums, its P/E
ratio was around 100; the recent recovery of its price has caused it to
spike to a high of over 600 in February–March of 2013.141 Comcast’s
P/E ratio during the same period ranged roughly from 17 to 18.142
It is thus unlikely that withholding conventional programming
could serve as a basis for anticompetitive behavior. However, there is
one type of programming that would be difficult to replicate: live
sports, which Crawford characterizes as a programming battering ram
(p. 141). In apparent recognition of its unique nature, she devotes an
entire chapter to sports programming.
Crawford is correct that sports are unlike other programming
properties, in that video distributors are not free to develop their own
sources of supply.143 Although Crawford portrays NBC’s sports holdings as extensive (pp. 144–47), on closer inspection it becomes clear
that NBC Universal is far from a dominant player in television sports.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
137
138

Yoo, supra note 31, at 230.
Id.; Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY
L.J. 1579, 1634 (2003).
139 2012 Video Competition Report, supra note 120, at 8728.
140 Geoff Duncan, Amazon Joins Netflix, Hulu, Google with Original TV Programming, DIGITAL
TRENDS (May 3, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/home-theater/amazon-joins-netflix-hulu
-google-with-original-tv-programming.
141 See Netflix PE Ratio (TTM), YCHARTS, http://ycharts.com/companies/NFLX/pe_ratio
(last visited Nov. 24, 2013).
142 See Comcast PE Ratio (TTM), YCHARTS, http://ycharts.com/companies/CMCSA/pe_ratio
(last visited Nov. 24, 2013).
143 Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 218 n.16
(2004); Yoo, supra note 138, at 1634 n.139.
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Its expenditures on the four major sports leagues lag far behind Disney
and News Corp.’s expenditures. And even though Crawford is correct
that the fan base to whom NBC Universal televises NHL hockey is
quite loyal (p. 148), the licensing fees for hockey amount to a pittance
at $40 million.144 Finally, while NBC Universal did commit to pay
$4.4 billion to televise the Olympics over a twenty-year span, this only
amounts to $220 million per year, which is too small to change NBC
Universal’s position in the rankings.145
FIGURE 3: ANNUAL COMMITMENTS
TO MAJOR SPORTS LEAGUES ($ MILLIONS)146
OWNER
Disney (ABC, ESPN)
News Corp. (Fox)
Comcast–NBC
CBS
Time Warner (TBS, TNT)

COMMITMENT
$1849
$1142
$690
$623
$438

When it comes to sports programming, it is far from clear that
Comcast holds the upper hand. While Crawford suggests that other
companies have little choice but to deal with Comcast on its terms (p.
68), she recognizes that sports properties such as ESPN possess the
clout to reverse the tables (p. 119). Recent attempts by sports leagues
to set up their own cable channels have altered industry dynamics still
further. Nonetheless, Crawford insists on interpreting Comcast’s
sports deals in a way that raises alarm. When Comcast paid too little,
it was a reflection of Comcast’s market dominance (p. 147). When
Comcast paid too much, Crawford interpreted it as a foreclosure premium (pp. 147–48). An equally likely interpretation is that the disputes simply represent hard, arms-length bargaining and good faith
disagreements over the relative value of the property.
Even if Comcast does not deny OVDs access to its content,
Crawford warns that Comcast can use usage-based billing and bandwidth caps to make OVD-delivered video more expensive and to discourage its customers from relying on OVDs as their primary source of
video programming (pp. 175–82). In addition, Crawford warns that
Comcast might charge Netflix exorbitant amounts to terminate its traffic (pp. 182–85).
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
144 WR HAMBRECHT + CO, THE U.S. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS MARKET & FRANCHISE
VALUE REPORT 19 fig.10 (2012).
145 Id.
146 Source: Id.
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Crawford is correct that monthly bandwidth caps represent an imperfect way to measure the impact that a person’s traffic will have on
the network. The real issue is how much traffic a person generates
during peak periods (p. 176). Thus, a person who consumes a great
deal of bandwidth may have no impact on other users if she makes
sure to do it when the network is not congested, in which case monthly
usage would overstate that person’s impact on congestion. Conversely,
a person who produces small amounts of traffic during peak periods
may be the source of congestion even though the total amount of
bandwidth he or she transmits is minimal.147 The existence of competitive options would limit Comcast’s ability to harm OVDs. And although usage caps that are not tied to peak usage are imperfect ways
to meter consumption, the problem of network congestion is quite real.
In any event, claims that Comcast will exert bargaining power over
Netflix have failed to materialize. Instead, it is Netflix that seems to
have the upper hand over network providers. Netflix is asking broadband Internet access providers either to terminate its traffic on a settlement-free basis (through a practice called “peering”) or to accept
traffic from its new, proprietary content-delivery network, Open Connect. In either case, rather than paying networks to deliver video traffic to individual end users, as Netflix used to do, Netflix is now asking
for (and often receiving) that service for free, with Netflix only offering
HD and 3D content if the ISP agrees.148 The insistence on peering is
made all the more curious by the fact that networks typically peer only
when volumes are symmetrical.149 In the case of Netflix, the traffic is
likely to be radically asymmetrical, with Netflix generating up to onethird of all of the traffic flowing through the Internet during peak
times. Yet it has nonetheless been able to induce a large number of
ISPs around the world to accept Open Connect. Instead of Netflix being held hostage by the cable companies, it is the cable companies who
complain that they are being held hostage by Netflix.150 Crawford’s
advice that Netflix avoid controversy until the day comes when the
cable operators need Netflix more than Netflix needs them (p. 120)
thus appears to have become relevant sooner than she expected.
Crawford closes her chapter on “The Biggest Squeeze of All” by asking, “How is Netflix doing today?” (p. 187). The answer appears to be,
“Fine, thank you.” That said, although this answer seems relatively
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
147
148

Yoo, supra note 25, at 206.
See Leah Powell, Netflix’s SEXY New Technology, WALL ST. CHEAT SHEET (June 5, 2012),
http://wallstcheatsheet.com/stocks/netflixs-sexy-new-technology.html.
149 Yoo, Innovations in the Internet’s Architecture, supra note 52, at 84.
150 Tom Cheredar, Time Warner Cable Says Netflix Is Holding Super HD & 3D Content Hostage, VENTUREBEAT (Jan. 17, 2013, 3:02 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2013/01/17/time-warner
-cable-says-netflix-is-holding-super-hd-3d-content-hostage.
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clear now, it was not so obvious just a few short months ago. My
point is not to use hindsight to criticize a prediction that ended up not
panning out. The fact that Netflix’s share price tumbled once suggests
that it could happen again. Instead, my aim is to underscore the importance of being humble about our ability to foresee the future and to
highlight the dangers of basing prescriptive regulatory policies on too
strong a preconception of the future.
Predicting the future is hard. As the FCC noted in its most recent
video competition report, OVD business and revenue models are still
in a state of flux.151 Indeed, the battle for streaming video is just heating up, with Verizon entering into a joint venture with Redbox and
YouTube to implement Content ID to facilitate professional content,
and services such as Facebook, Mubi, Fandor, Amazon’s Video on
Demand, and Sony’s Crackle pursuing new business models.152 Moreover, ESPN recently offered to pay wireless ISPs an additional premium if their bandwidth would not count against user bandwidth
caps.153 In an industry undergoing such dynamic change, regulators
should think long and hard before intervening prophylactically to protect against some anticipated state of the world that may or may not
come to pass.
Crawford’s assertion that combining Comcast’s cable networks
with NBC Universal’s programming content will harm consumers
thus depends on a series of propositions that all must prove true if the
scenario she predicts is to unfold. Cable must hold a monopoly over
transmission. NBC Universal must control essential programming
without which other firms cannot compete. Moreover, the argument
must overcome the large body of empirical evidence showing that vertical integration is unlikely to harm consumers as well as the fact that
Netflix seems to be gaining the upper hand in this particular struggle.
In essence, Crawford’s primary argument is that AOL’s strategy of
combining content and conduit was ahead of its time (pp. 102–04) and
that Comcast will succeed where AOL failed (pp. 105, 109, 167). History provides ample reason to be skeptical of this claim. The bankruptcy of Excite@Home and the recent divestitures of DirecTV and
Time Warner Cable make it as (if not more) likely that AOL’s attempt
to combine content and conduit was simply a bad idea. If so, that episode stands as a shining example of the benefits of not intervening and
instead allowing companies to experiment with different business

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
151
152
153

2012 Video Competition Report, supra note 120, at 8738 ¶ 286, 8739 ¶ 290.
Id. at 8724 ¶ 250, 8726 ¶¶ 254–255, 8734–35 ¶¶ 277–281.
Amol Sharma et al., ESPN Eyes Subsidizing Wireless-Data Plans, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2013,
7:31 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324059704578473400083982568.html.
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strategies.154 Although this history suggests that the Comcast–NBC
Universal merger may ultimately fare no better than those previous efforts, it is not the province of regulators to protect corporate officers
and shareholders from making mistakes, if for no other reason than
that it is so difficult to recognize one in advance.
C. Nonbarking Dogs
Another strange aspect of the concerns Crawford raises regarding
the merger is that she implicitly treats the struggle between cable companies and OVDs as the central issue in broadband policy. As such, the
companies usually identified as the leaders of the Internet industry —
Google, Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook, and Intel — receive just
a passing mention and play only a tangential role in the analysis.
The omission is striking. As of October 18, 2013, Apple, Google,
and Microsoft are three of the four biggest companies in the world in
terms of market capitalization.155 In fact, both Apple and Google each
have market valuations that are three times larger than Comcast’s and
that exceed the size of the entire cable industry combined. Moreover,
Apple and Google (soon to be joined by Intel) both have ongoing settop box initiatives, and Amazon, Facebook, and Google’s YouTube
have begun to enter into long-form video distribution.
The addition of these other firms changes the calculus dramatically.
Crawford acknowledges that Apple has the clout to keep ISPs in
check; indeed, she characterizes the current balance of power as a
“standoff of sorts” (p. 163). Moreover, she concedes that the major actors (which include Apple, Google, and Microsoft, as well as AT&T,
Verizon, Comcast, and Time Warner Cable) have reached a state of
“equipoise” in which each firm is too big for any of the others to absorb or crush (p. 168). The logical implication is that major regulatory
intervention is harder to justify.
Additionally, broadening the vision to include more of the value
chain reveals a deep tension about where the monopoly problem really
lies. In the context of the network neutrality debate, it is the network.
In the context of the cable program access rules, it is video content. In
the context of the FTC’s investigation of Google, it is the search engine. In calls for opening up Apple’s App Store, it is the smartphone.
Without the discipline of requiring complainants to articulate a specific theory of harm, these arguments become plastic, transforming to fit
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
154 As such, perhaps regulators were not so much haunted by the failure of the AOL merger
conditions, as Crawford suggests (pp. 106, 229), as they were edified about the prudence of exercising restraint in the face of uncertainty.
155 Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Google’s Jumps to No. 3, After Apple and Exxon, in Market Cap, CNN
MONEY (Oct. 19, 2013, 12:37 PM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2013/10/19/google-apple-exxon
-microsoft.
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the politics of the moment. Indeed, if market power exists in more
than one level (such as in both content and conduit as Crawford contends (pp. 88, 216)), consumers may benefit more if the merger is permitted to proceed.156
III. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
OF REGULATORY INTERVENTION
Another facet of regulatory interventions that is often overlooked is
that they rarely create stable equilibria. Instead, much as squeezing a
balloon on one end causes it to expand in some other place, every governmental mandate creates a series of secondary and tertiary consequences that must be explored.
A. Impact on Investment Incentives
One of Crawford’s core recommendations is that the government
should place restrictions on the prices that network providers can
charge (pp. 261, 265). There is an extent to which this recommendation is working at cross purposes with itself. Using regulation to reduce the profitability of an oligopoly can have the perverse impact of
locking the oligopoly into place. The problem is well illustrated by the
FCC’s financing and syndication (finsyn) rules, which Crawford admires (pp. 129–31). Finsyn was designed to restrict the profitability of
the big three networks — ABC, CBS, and NBC — by limiting their
ability to hold the syndication rights in the programs that they televised. Unfortunately, finsyn also reduced the profitability of potential
entrants, which made the emergence of a competitor that would further diversify the market less likely.157 It is thus no accident that the
Fox Network needed to ask for a finsyn waiver before it could enter.158
Even though breaking up the broadcast triopoly had long been one of
the FCC’s policy goals, the rules it established to limit the triopoly’s
market power ran the risk of helping cement the triopoly into place.
Finsyn had another unanticipated consequence. The rules were also supposed to limit the networks’ ability to pressure independent program producers into giving up their syndication rights. Unfortunately,
the rules had the perverse effect of hurting independent program producers by reducing the value of programming to the networks and
thus the amount the networks were willing to pay for it.159 In the process, the independent program producers were forced to assume the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
156
157
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For a general discussion of double marginalization, see Yoo, supra note 25, at 192–93, 260–61.
Yoo, supra note 94, at 49 n.188.
See Fox Broadcasting Co. Request for Temporary Waiver of Certain Provisions of 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.658, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 3211 (1990).
159 Schurz Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1046, 1051 (7th Cir. 1992).
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long-term risk associated with these programs even though the networks’ larger size and greater diversification placed them in a better
position to bear it.160
The finsyn experience teaches that mandating access and regulating the price of access to a monopoly facility must be undertaken with
considerable care. A vertical chain of production is efficient only if
each link is competitive. The primary policy goal should be identifying those links that are the most concentrated and protected by entry
barriers and promoting competition within them. In the case of the
Internet, that link exists where the provider provides connectivity from
an interconnection point in the city to individual residences, often
called “the last mile.” Only if entry into the last mile is impossible
does it make sense to pursue secondary goals, such as promoting competition and innovation in other links in the chain. The problem is
that once entry into the last mile becomes feasible, regulators must
make sure to stop mandating access to the network and to stop regulating rates. The short-run increase in prices provides both the signal
to other actors that the market is in disequilibrium and the incentive
for potential entrants to start making investments in alternative or additional capacity. Continuing to mandate access would only serve to
entrench the monopoly by undermining incentives to invest and depriving would-be entrants of their natural strategic partners.
Indeed, this is the lesson emerging from the European approach,
which regulates rates and requires network owners to share their facilities with competitors. Although European Internet users have enjoyed low prices that have in turn caused adoption rates to increase,
forcing providers to extend below-cost access to some customers has
forestalled investments in FTTH and other next-generation networks.161 Attempts to use mandated access as stepping stones toward
full facilities-based competition have proven unsuccessful.162 The robust U.S. investments in fiber, advanced generations of DSL, and LTE
suggest that entry is indeed feasible. Even if entry were not yet feasible, one would need to have faith that regulators would have the ability to lift regulation swiftly as soon as those circumstances changed.
There is another fundamental irony underlying proposals to mandate access to last-mile broadband facilities. One reason that Crawford
favors such proposals is that the Internet generates benefits to others (p.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
160
161

Id.
See Christopher S. Yoo, Deregulation vs. Reregulation of Telecommunications: A Clash of
Regulatory Paradigms, 36 J. CORP. L. 847, 859–61 & nn.103–04 (2011) (showing that lower prices
sometimes have no major effect or a negative effect on last-mile services).
162 See id. at 862–63.
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17).163 This argument taps into the analysis of externalities associated
with economist A.C. Pigou and extended by Ronald Coase. Externalities come in two forms. Conduct that generates positive externalities
creates benefits that accrue to other people, such as occurs when a person makes home improvements that increase the value of adjacent
houses. Conduct that generates negative externalities imposes costs on
other people, such as occurs when a factory produces smoke that lessens
neighbors’ enjoyment of their land.
The problem is that individuals deciding whether to undertake a
particular activity consider only their private costs and benefits without taking into account the impact on others. For example, homeowners considering whether to improve their homes would compare the
cost of doing so with the increase in the value of their houses while ignoring any increase in the value of nearby houses. The fact that they
would not take into account the full social value of the improvement
means that they will sometimes fail to make an improvement even
when the net social value of doing so exceeds the cost.
The conventional wisdom offers two potential solutions to this
problem. First, the government can induce more of those positive externality–generating activities through direct subsidies.164 But needless
to say, the debates in Washington, D.C., are currently focusing on how
to reduce, not increase, government spending. Even worse, instead of
providing a subsidy, Crawford’s proposal to mandate access is better
understood as a form of taxation by regulation that would have precisely the opposite effect.165
Second, the wedge between private and social benefit can be reduced if firms are permitted to capture more of the positive externalities they generate for others. One logical way to accomplish this is by
permitting them to vertically integrate into those complementary activities that benefit from those positive externalities.166 For example, Internet connectivity creates benefits for consumers by stimulating innovative content and applications. The fact that the network provider
does not capture any of those benefits can lead to systematic underinvestment. A straightforward solution would be to allow the network
provider to internalize some of the value created by these new forms of
content and applications. Unfortunately, the separation of content and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
163 For a more extensive argument for access based on positive spillovers, see generally
FRISCHMANN, supra note 16.
164 A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 381 (4th ed. 1932).
165 See Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22 (1971).
166 See Timothy F. Bresnahan & M. Trajtenberg, General Purpose Technologies: “Engines of
Growth”?, 65 J. ECONOMETRICS 83, 94 (1995) (noting proposals for vertical integration of complementary activities in the technology space).
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conduit and the remedy of mandatory access that Crawford proposes
would effectively preclude this solution.
B. Transfer of Value from the Network’s Core to Its Edge
Another benefit of the Internet’s architecture is to allow different
aspects of the network to act independently. The networks simply
pass along data without knowing anything about the nature of the
communications they are carrying. Conversely, so long as content and
application providers present their data in accordance with the Internet protocol, they do not need to know anything about the nature of
the networks over which their traffic is passing.
This independence yields a number of advantages. Insulating each
component from the details of the other components promotes flexibility, improves fault localization, and makes it easier to make changes to
components without causing ripples throughout the entire system.167
Cabining the way components interact with one another radically simplifies the testing that must be conducted.168 It also speeds innovation
by allowing parallel testing of multiple solutions.169
At the same time, this architecture carries with it a number of potential drawbacks. Though the architecture creates value by encouraging parallel experimentation with new solutions, it also shifts the
value gained from those experiments from the center of the network to
the components where the experiments are taking place.170 Not only
does this deprive the last broadband providers of the revenue needed
to support the build-out of next-generation networks, it creates a potential perverse incentive for service providers. Each of the complementary service providers has the ability and incentive to maximize its
own interests and optimize locally.171 The problem is that individual
optimization decisions may not produce outcomes that maximize glob-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
167 See Christopher S. Yoo, Modularity Theory and Internet Policy (Inst. for L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 13-15, 2013) [hereinafter Yoo, Modularity Theory], available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2032221.
168 See id. at 19–20.
169 Id. at 21–22.
170 See 1 CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES 267–68 (2000).
171 See RANDY BUSH & DAVID MEYER, SOME INTERNET ARCHITECTURAL GUIDELINES
AND PHILOSOPHY 7–8 (Internet Eng’g Task Force Network Working Grp., Request for Comments No. 3439, 2002), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc3439 (describing technical inefficiencies that may arise from vertically separating network functions); Henry W. Chesbrough & David
J. Teece, When Is Virtual Virtuous? Organizing for Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1996,
at 65, 66 (describing local optimization interests of members of a “virtual company” collaboration);
Jon Crowcroft et al., Is Layering Harmful?, IEEE NETWORK, Jan. 1992, at 20, 23–24.
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al value.172 In addition, no actor is in a natural position to exercise
leadership over the platform.173
C. The Potential Benefits of Nonuniformity
Finally, Crawford’s vision of a world in which all networks are
mandated to be open ignores the fact that end users may derive significant benefits from alternative architectures. If everyone wants the
same thing from the network, the optimal course is to offer a single
network designed to satisfy what end users demand. The engineering
community has long recognized, however, that the current architecture
is ill suited to support key features such as security, mobility, mass media distribution, quality of service, and multihoming.174 As the demand for these services increases, the natural course is for network
providers to diversify their offerings to meet the growing heterogeneity
of consumer demand.
Allowing firms to pursue different strategies can yield real benefits.
For example, Apple has always insisted on a relatively closed architecture to help ensure that end users’ experiences remain positive.175 As a
simple matter of business strategy, one would expect Google’s Android
platform to avoid becoming simply a me-too offering by allowing a more
open architecture. Permitting heterogeneity also allows consumers to
receive the benefits from both approaches, while at the same time enjoying the manner in which the presence of an open platform can serve
as a safety valve against any abuses attempted by a closed platform.
Conversely, mandating access to the network could have an adverse effect on innovation. Requiring the network to accept any
properly configured data at a particular location effectively locks that
interface into place.176 This requirement can inhibit the network’s
ability to respond to technological changes that would otherwise push
it toward a different architecture.177
The fact that end users, applications, technologies, and business relationships on the Internet are becoming more heterogeneous suggests
that the natural response is for the network to become more diverse as
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See Yoo, Modularity Theory, supra note 167, at 27, 46.
See Chesbrough & Teece, supra note 171, at 69–70 (describing how IBM lost its dominance
over the decentralized PC market due to its inability to control how other companies developed
IBM-compatible products).
174 See Yoo, Modularity Theory supra note 167, at 57.
175 Id. at 55; see also Peter Decherney et al., Are Those Who Ignore History Doomed to Repeat
It?, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1627, 1676 (2011) (reviewing TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH (2010))
(describing Apple as creating a closed, vertically integrated system that “benefit[s] consumers”).
176 See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet:
The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1900 (2007).
177 See Yoo, supra note 94, at 43–45 (describing how infrastructure and equipment requirements have changed with the transition of Internet services to broadband).

2014]

TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS

945

well.178 Therefore, positing regulatory policy as a choice between open
and closed architectures may represent a false dichotomy. End users
may be best off with a mixture of both. Not only can the availability
of different solutions deliver greater value, but divided technical leadership can also represent an important form of rivalry,179 and experimentation with new standards may properly be regarded not as pathological, but rather as a sign of innovative health.180
IV. ASSESSING THE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Crawford’s concluding chapter offers a series of policy recommendations. Specifically, she calls on the government to support broadscale
deployment of municipal FTTH and to mandate the separation of content and conduit. These recommendations, however, each include some
fundamental internal tensions that the book does not fully address.
A. Subsidize Fiber-to-the-Home
One of Crawford’s core recommendations is that the government
subsidize gigabit symmetric FTTH owned and operated by municipalities (pp. 263–65). Capable of delivering download speeds of up to
100,000 Gbps,181 FTTH possesses sufficient bandwidth to compete
with cable.182 While FTTH has continued to grow, covering approximately 15% of U.S. households in December 2010,183 17% of U.S.
households in December 2011,184 and 23% of U.S. households in December 2012, 185 Verizon (the leading provider of FTTH) has stopped
expanding its FiOS footprint (pp. 3, 78, 80, 113, 225, 236).
As Crawford recognizes at other points, the primary deterrent to the
rollout of fiber is its prohibitive cost (pp. 78–79, 161, 236). A recent
published estimate suggests that it costs Verizon FiOS $700 per home
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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180 See Shane Greenstein, Glimmers and Signs of Innovative Health in the Commercial Internet, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 25, 42–55 (2010).
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to lay the fiber on the utility poles and conduits that pass each home
and an additional $650 per household to connect individual houses to
that fiber and to install the fiber modem in the house.186 If every house
where FiOS is available purchased the service, it would cost only $1350
per household. But if penetration rates are only fifty percent, Verizon
would have to recover twice the cost per home passed from each subscriber ($1400). When combined with the $650 installation cost, the total cost would be $2050 per household. Since actual adoption rates
were 37.3% at the end of 2012,187 FiOS costs $2500 per subscriber
without including operating, marketing, and service costs. Costs per
home passed for Google Fiber in Kansas City are likely to be similar,188
and costs for broadscale deployment in Japan are somewhat higher.189
Based on these numbers, the cost to offer 100 Mbps service to 100
million households would be roughly $250 billion. Given that Verizon
FiOS and Google Fiber are currently deploying in areas of fairly high
density, these numbers suggest that the estimate listed in the National
Broadband Plan of $350 billion to provide 100 Mbps service to 100
million homes may well be realistic, despite Crawford’s skepticism (p.
267). The cost to extend fiber to those areas that are not currently
served by broadband is likely to be much higher.
There is thus reason to question whether FTTH would be a good
use of limited public resources. And even if it were a foregone conclusion that the entire country would need FTTH, timing matters. When
Verizon announced its plans to build FiOS, the capital markets regarded the venture as too risky. Consequently, the bond rating agencies lowered Verizon’s bond rating and Wall Street slashed its stock
price, thereby raising the cost of both debt and equity capital on all of
the company’s future projects. It is as if Verizon had borrowed the
money and immediately begun to pay interest on it. As the National
Broadband Plan noted, whether that ultimately proves to be a good
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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investment depends on how quickly the demand for higher bandwidth
services develops.190 In other words, there is substantial benefit to
making sure that investments coincide with demand.
Moreover, there is good reason to question whether government
ownership is likely to represent the best institutional form for running
fiber. As an initial matter, the empirical literature on government
ownership is not encouraging. A recent survey of fifty-two studies
comparing publicly and privately owned firms found that only five of
the studies concluded that publicly owned firms perform better than
privately owned firms.191 Of the remaining studies, thirty-two found
private ownership to be superior, and the results of fifteen were ambiguous or not statistically significant.192
To the extent that government ownership has succeeded, it has
done so in industries such as water or electric power, in which the
transmission technologies are stable and the fact that entry was unlikely obviates concerns about investment incentives.193 Conversely, the
experience with the government’s takeover of the telephone system
during World War I reveals that government ownership does poorly
when the underlying technology is undergoing a period of dynamic
change and when the infrastructure needs significant capital investments. In such cases, governments often struggle to make the best
technology choices and must finance investments through tax revenues
or bond issues rather than risk capital.194
More recent history is no more comforting. The collapse of municipal WiFi has generated a wide array of postmortem analyses trying to
figure out what went wrong.195 The burgeoning municipal fiber
movement appears to be more hype than substance. The available data suggest that municipal fiber deployments face significantly higher
costs compared to private deployments in terms of both cost per home
passed and cost per subscriber.196 As of August 2012, Chattanooga’s
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much ballyhooed fiber deployment had garnered a grand total of eleven customers for its maximum data rate plan.197
B. Bring Back Common Carriage
Crawford’s other core recommendation is to return to the regime in
which transport was separated from content (pp. 37–38, 45, 264–65).
She repeatedly laments the death of common carriage, which historically has mandated nondiscrimination and the regulation of rates (pp.
36, 53–56, 61–62, 94, 121, 160, 162, 186–87, 230, 270).
In so doing, she hearkens back to a longstanding regulatory regime
without taking into account the substantial literature exploring its limitations and shortcomings. As I discuss in greater detail elsewhere, as an
initial matter, common carriage works best when the product is a commodity that does not vary in terms of quality, firms employ uniform
production technologies, and market share is relatively stable.198 It is ill
suited to circumstances in which the quality of service varies along multiple dimensions, production technologies are heterogeneous, and business volumes change rapidly.199 In addition, a substantial literature exists cataloging how the traditional tools of common carriage regulation
reward inefficiency, deter innovation, and facilitate collusion.200
Crawford acknowledges that common carriage has historically been
hard to enforce (p. 32) and that behavioral remedies do not work particularly well (p. 63). Yet she calls for a return to common carriage
without grappling with how to address the recognized shortcomings in
the regime.
CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, we are left with the question of what to
make of Crawford’s concerns. Certainly, it is possible that cable may
end up being the only broadband platform capable of delivering video
and that the combination of content and conduit allows it to forestall
the development of OVDs like Netflix.
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But an examination of the current state of the industry and humility about anyone’s ability to predict the future provide reasons to be
open minded as to whether competition and scientific progress might
lead to a better outcome. The emergence of new technologies has
eliminated the market inefficiencies that for decades had been the focus of federal policy: the monopolies over voice telephony and multichannel video distribution and the triopoly over television programming. At the same time, network providers are investing billions of
dollars into alternative network capacity.201 Beyond that, the Internet
has provided a host of new services that have revolutionized the way
people interact with each other and obtain information.
In short, I look at the same reality as Professor Crawford and see
reason for optimism, not pessimism. I believe the technological solutions are reasonably promising and the literature finding that vertical
integration generally enhances welfare is sufficiently robust to justify
tolerating new business practices until real-world data show them to
be harmful. Acting preemptively overestimates our ability to foresee
the future and risks depriving potential innovations of the breathing
room they need to emerge.
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